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THE MANACLED OCTOPUS: THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
AND EPA ENFORCEMENT INVOLVING FEDERAL AGENCIES
WILLIAM C. TUCKER, EsQ.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) affords the United States, particularly
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a powerful enforce-
ment tool for obtaining timely private-party cleanups of Superfund
sites and recovering costs expended in governmental cleanups.2
However, CERCLA enforcement becomes much more complex
when federal agencies are considered potentially responsible par-
ties (PRPs) at Superfund sites, owing to the Executive Branch's
longstanding adherence to the "Unitary Executive" principle.3
Under that principle, inter-agency disputes, including enforcement
of CERC[A by EPA against potentially liable federal agencies, are
considered matters for resolution within the Executive Branch and
generally are not submitted to the federal courts.
Although CERCLA clearly designates federal and state agen-
cies as potentially liable "persons,"4 the Executive Branch has con-
1. William C. Tucker is a Senior Assistant Regional Counsel, U.S. E.P.A., Re-
gion II. He is writing here in his individual capacity and not as government coun-
sel. All opinions expressed herein, including but not limited to positions on legal
or policy issues, are entirely his own and are not to be construed as those of EPA or
the United States.
2. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (2000) (establishing procedures for recouping
Superfund remediation costs).
3. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Council on Competitiveness: Executive Oversight
of Agency Rule Making: The Myth of the Unitary Executive, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 299,
300 n.4 (1993) (discussing Executive's adherence to Unitary Executive theory); see
also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (recognizing implicitly Execu-
tive's adherence to Unitary Executive principle and that President has authority to
review other executive officials' actions). The "Unitary Executive" principle is es-
sentially that all components of the Executive Branch are "unified" meaning they
all constitute one entity. See Nelson D. Cary, A Primer on Federal Facility Compliance
With Environmental Laws: Where Do We Go From Here?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 801,
828-32 (1993) (describing Unitary Executive theory). The President is ultimately
accountable for all the actions of the Executive Branch because the President is
the head of the Executive Branch. Id. According to the Unitary Executive princi-
ple, under the Case or Controversy Clause in Article III of the United States Con-
stitution, executive agencies cannot sue each other because they are in effect the
same party. Id.
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sistently taken the position that EPA cannot independently enforce
CERCLA in the federal courts against federal agency PRPs (federal
PRPs), because to do so would violate the United States Constitu-
tion.5 Notwithstanding this policy, EPA frequently finds itself
(sometimes along with other federal agencies which have delegated
enforcement authority under CERCLA) 6 a plaintiff in CERCLA en-
forcement actions involving federal PRP defendants. 7 In such
cases, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) represents all
federal agencies involved.8 Thus DOJ, as the litigation arm of the
federal Executive, frequently represents both EPA and federal PRP
defendants in the same CERCLA litigation.9 Yet, it is not at all clear
that the Unitary Executive principle precludes adjudications be-
tween EPA and federal PRPs as a matter of law, and therefore re-
quires representation of both sides by DOJ before the federal
courts.10
Reliance on the Unitary Executive by the United States can be
attributed to policies of past administrations, going at least as far
back as the Reagan Administration. 1 However, some writers have
5. See Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th
Cong. 668, 675 (1987) (memorandum from John Harmon, Ass't Att'y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to Michael J. Egan, Assoc. Att'y Gen.) (allowing EPA to sue an-
other agency would violate established principle that "no man can create ajusticia-
ble controversy against himself").
6. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987) (designating
federal natural resource trustees). Most frequently such agencies are the federal
Natural Resources Trustees, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration and the Department of the Interior, but they sometimes include agencies
with delegated enforcement authority, such as Department of Defense (DOD) and
the Department of Energy (DOE). See id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,016, 61 Fed.
Reg. 45,871 (Aug. 30, 1996) (amending Exec. Order No. 12,580 to delegate CER-
CLA § 106 order and § 122 settlement authority with respect to federal facilities to
a number of federal agencies, including DOE and DOD).
7. Federal agencies alleged to be liable under CERCLA § 107 are usually
brought into litigation following the filing of a government complaint through
third-party counter-claims against the unitary United States.
8. For a further discussion about federal agencies involved, see supra note 6
(explaining DOJ's representative role in cases with multiple PRPs).
9. See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2000) (stating that Attorney
General will "secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat"
caused by hazardous substances' release).
10. See Cary, supra note 3 at 827-30 (explaining Unitary Executive principal);
See generally Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1992) (expanding on
Unitary Executive theory); Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can
The Federal Government Sue Itself? 32 WM. & MARY L. Ruv. 893 (1991) (discussing
Unitary Executive theory generally).
11. See, e.g., Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency
Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary
Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 634 (1989) (discussing Unitary Executive
2
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questioned whether the Constitution precludes EPA from taking ju-
dicial enforcement action against federal PRPs, or requires that
DOJ act as the arbitrator of potentially justiciable inter-agency CER-
CIA disputes.12 In this view, adherence to the Unitary Executive
would appear to be strictly a matter of policy, and the question
posed becomes: what interests does this policy serve? The obvious
answer is that it is designed to strengthen the executive by preserv-
ing its policy-making prerogative, rather than weakening the execu-
tive by submitting intra-Branch disputes for resolution by the
judiciary.
Such a rationale, while persuasive in the context of policy de-
velopment, is less persuasive when applied to enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws by one agency against another. It is often assumed
that a "unitary" executive, hierarchical and centralized, is strong-
est.13 However, in the enforcement context, this Article proposes a
paradigm of the modern executive as a complex organism whose
various departments and agencies function as multiple appendages:
an octopus, if you will. The strength of such an executive depends
not upon rigid central control, but upon the untrammeled, vigor-
ous and independent operation of its agency "arms." In the CER-
CLA enforcement context, restricting the free use of enforcement
discretion (as well as defense capability) of executive agencies by
exercising centralized control of the type usually associated with
policy development, in effect, manacles the octopus, rendering the
executive weaker and less effective.
Congress has the power to grant independent representation
in CERCLA cases involving federal PRPs to plaintiff federal agen-
cies, including EPA.14 This might alleviate some of the difficulties
that arise when DOJ represents EPA as plaintiff and federal PRP
agencies as defendants in the same Superfund action.1 5 It might
also help to ensure balanced representation of all federal agencies'
principle's origins). Rosenberg states, "[T]he theory of the Unitary Executive is
and has always been a myth concocted by the Reagan administration to provide a
semblance of legal respectability for an aggressive administrative strategy designed
to accomplish what its failed legislative agenda could not." Id.
12. See id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 3, at 301 (discussing adherence to Uni-
tary Executive theory).
13. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive,
48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 37-38 (1995) (justifying "Unitary Executive" principle as means
to strengthen Executive).
14. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of possible
alternatives to strict adherence to the Unitary Executive.
15. See infra notes 106-51 and accompanying text for a discussion on how
appearance of conflict of interest presented by Unitary Executive principle could
be mitigated by independent representation in enforcement of CERCLA.
2005]
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interests in Superfund litigation involving federal PRPs16 and en-
sure consistency in EPA's dealings with all PRPs in Superfund mat-
ters.1 7 Although Superfund has been amended a number of times,
Congress has not elected to make this change and is unlikely to do
so.
18
There is a simpler solution which could be implemented
within the Executive Branch and is arguably consistent with the
Unitary Executive principle. This would be to establish staff-level
"firewalls" that would separate opposing government counsel in
such cases. 19 Such firewalls could be instituted as a matter of gen-
eral policy or on a case-by-case basis. They would prevent the ex-
change of information at the governmental staff level and allow
governmental counsel to advocate freely on behalf of their respec-
tive client agencies in negotiations and in court, and would not dis-
turb the function of DOJ management as policy-maker or executive
mediator of inter-agency disputes arising in the course of
litigation.20
This Article first briefly outlines CERCLA's statutory scheme
and then discusses some of the specific problems that can arise in
the litigation context in connection with the Unitary Executive
Principle. 21 Section II provides an overview of CERCLA.22 Section
III undertakes an analysis of the case law concerning the constitu-
tionality of inter-agency litigation.23 Section IV reviews the Ameri-
can Bar Association's position on conflicts of interest as applied to
government counsel in the context of representation of federal
16. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of imbalance
in representation of federal interests in CERCLA settlements that can be rectified.
17. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the incon-
sistency in EPA's dealings with all PRPs that can be remedied.
18. CERCLA has been amended several times since originally enacted in
1980. It was subsequently amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act in 1986. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). CER-
CLA was next amended in 1992 by the Community Environmental Response Facili-
tation Act. See Pub. L. No. 102-426, 106 Stat. 2174 (1992). Then, in 1996, CERCLA
was amended by the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance
Protection Act. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-462 (1996). Finally, in
2002, changes to CERCLA were made by the Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act. See Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
19. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the sec-
ond proposed solution.
20. See infra notes 107-63 and accompanying text for a more complete discus-
sion of firewalls and the ethics of dual representation.
21. See infra notes 27-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA's
statutory scheme and some problems with enforcement.
22. See id. (outlining CERCLA generally).
23. See infra notes 68-105 and accompanying text (discussing potential consti-
tutional problems with inter-agency representation).
4
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plaintiff agencies and federal PRPs in Superfund cases. 24 Finally,
Section V explores the question of independent EPA representa-
tion in CERCLA cases involving federal PRPs2 5 and proposes an Ex-
ecutive Branch solution: implementation of staff-level firewalls. 26
II. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE IN THE CERCLA CONTEXT
A. CERCLA's Statutory Scheme
Federal agencies are frequently linked to privately-owned
Superfund sites as generators or former owner/operators within
the meaning of section 107 (a) of CERCLA.27 Section 107 (a) gener-
ally imposes liability for response costs upon "any person" falling
within the four broad classes set forth therein, including genera-
tors, transporters and owners/operators. 28 Section 101(21) of CER-
CLA currently includes the United States Government in the
definition of "person."29 Because the United States takes the posi-
tion that the Unitary Executive principle precludes adjudication of
disputes between federal agencies, federal agencies are not named
as defendants in cost-recovery complaints brought by DOJ under
section 107 of CERCLA.3 0 However, EPA may issue information re-
quests and notices of potential liability to federal agencies and at-
tempt to require them to participate in Superfund response
actions. Federal PRPs may play a significant role as generators of
hazardous substances sent to a site or may be liable as former
24. See infra notes 106-51 and accompanying text (squaring ABA rules with
dual representation).
25. See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text (discussing independent
counsel's role in inter-agency representation).
26. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (hypothesizing about im-
plementing staff-level firewalls).
27. See CERCLA §§ 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4) (2000) (set-
ting forth categories of liable parties under CERCLA). Subsections 107(a) (1) and
(2) impose liability on "owners" and "operators" of facilities from which there has
been a release of hazardous substances. This is commonly referred to as "owner/
operator" liability. Id. Subsections 107(a) (3) and (4) impose liability upon gener-
ators and transporters of hazardous substances. This is commonly referred to as
generator" or "transporter" liability. See id.
28. See id. (detailing classes liable for costs consistent with national emergency
plan).
29. See CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (defining "person" as used
in CERCLA).
30. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987) (stating
"Sec. 6. Litigation... any representation pursuant to or under this Order in any
[CERCLA] judicial proceedings shall be by or through the Attorney General."); see
also Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Green, A Guide to Monetary Sanctions for Environ-
mental Violations by Federal Facilities, 17 PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 45, 57 (1999) (stating
DOJ "has long maintained that EPA lacks judicial enforcement authority over fed-
eral agencies and may not bring suit against them").
2005]
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owner/operators of a site. For that reason, private PRPs often
bring pressure on EPA to recognize and notify federal PRPs about
their potential liability.31 EPA also has the authority to name fed-
eral PRPs in unilateral orders, but only with the prior approval of
DOJ.
3 2
Even where EPA has not noticed a federal agency as a PRP, if
potentially liable, the federal agency will likely become involved,
not as a formal party to the litigation, but (if the case settles), as a
"settling federal agency" entitled to the same protections afforded
settling private parties.3 3 Finally, private parties frequently assert
counterclaims against federal PRPs for contribution when those pri-
vate parties are named as defendants in EPA-initiated CERCLA ac-
tions.3 4 Private PRPs may even initiate direct suits against federal
PRPs under section 107 if they have incurred "response costs. '3 5
B. CERCLA Enforcement Involving Federal PRPs
EPA frequently becomes involved in litigation with federal
PRPs in numerous areas of CERC[A enforcement. Because CER-
31. See CERCLA § 104(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) (2000) (authorizing EPA to
issue information requests and notices of potential liability); see also Exec. Order
No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987) (delegating CERCLA § 104(e) infor-
mation-gathering authority to EPA); see also Memorandum from Susan Bromm,
Dir., to Office of Regional Counsel, Superfund Division, Region VI, OSRE-EPA,
Transmittal of Guidance on Issuing CERCLA Section 104(e)(2) Information Requests to
Federal Agencies at Privately-owned Supeyfund Sites (June 14, 2004), available at http://
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/ 1 04e-fed-prp.
pdf (discussing Superfund cases involving federal PRPs).
32. See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1906(a) (2000) (explaining EPA au-
thority in certain CERCLA actions); see also Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg.
2923 (Jan. 23, 1987) (explaining Superfund implementation).
33. CERCtA settlements often involve both EPA and federal PRP defendants
as "settling federal agencies." See, e.g., Consent Decree, Rollins Envtl. Serv. (NJ)
Inc. v. United States; United States v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 1996 EPA Consent LEXIS
148 (Oct. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Rollins/AlliedSignal EPA Consent]; see alsoJoint
EPA/DOJ Memorandum, Revisions to the 1995 National Model Remedial Design/Reme-
dial Action (RD/RA) Consent Decree to Resolve Federal Potentially Responsible Party (PRP)
Liability (Dec. 28, 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/
policies/cleanup/superfund/rev-1 995mod-rd-ra-cd-fprp.pdf.
34. See CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1913(f) (2000) (authorizing private-party
suits for contribution to recover costs incurred in site cleanup).
35. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 577, 582 (2004)
(leaving open question whether private parties can maintain contribution action
under CERCLA § 107(a)). The Court has held that a purchaser of contaminated
property could not maintain a contribution action under CERCLA § 113(f)(1)
against the seller following the purchaser's voluntary cleanup of a contaminated
site, because such an action could only be sought "during or following" a CERCLA
action. See id. However, the question of whether or not a private party could main-
tain a suit for contribution under CERCLA § 107(a) was not directly addressed by
the Court. See id.
6
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CLA and an Executive Order require EPA to include DOJ in any
action brought against federal PRPs under CERCLA,3 6 EPA lacks
the same direct enforcement capability against federal PRPs that
EPA has with regard to private PRPs.37 Such direct action is often
highly effective in forcing PRPs to participate in settlement negotia-
tions in a timely and meaningful fashion. Under section 4(e) of
Executive Order 12,580 issued in 1987, the President delegated the
authority to EPA to issue administrative orders to federal agencies
pursuant to CERCLA section 106, but also required that EPA obtain
the concurrence of DOJ before exercising such authority.38 Be-
cause this concurrence is unlikely to be given, it is rarely sought.39
Thus, the delegation, 40 which might have strengthened EPA's hand
against federal PRP agencies, has been ineffective in ensuring vigor-
ous direct enforcement by EPA against federal PRPs.41
36. Compare CERCLA §§ 101(21), 106(a), 107(a), 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601 (21), 9606(a), 9607(a), 9620(a)(1) (2000), with Exec. Order No. 12,580,
52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987). The United States may be a liable "person"
under CERCLA § 101 (21), and therefore federal agencies are potentially subject
to an EPA enforcement under §§ 106(a) and 107(a). CERCLA § 101(21), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(21). In addition, CERCLA § 120, applicable to federal facilities,
provides that all branches of the federal government "shall be subject to, and com-
ply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedur-
ally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under
[CERCLA § 107]." CERCLA § 120(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1). However, ow-
ing to the requirements contained in Executive Order 12,580 that EPA be repre-
sented by DOJ in judicial enforcement proceedings under CERCLA § 107 and
obtain the concurrence of DOJ for issuance of administrative orders to federal
agencies under CERCLA § 106, independent action by EPA against federal PRPs is
extremely rare. CERCLA §§ 106(a), 107(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a) (2004);
see also Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, §§ 4(e) and 6(a) (Jan. 23,
1987).
37. As previously noted, EPA must obtain the approval of DOJ for the issu-
ance of a unilateral order to a federal PRP. See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a) (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987).
38. See supra note 33 (noting instances where EPA and other federal agencies
acted as "settling federal agencies" in same action).
39. The reasons for this may be several: first, as noted above, DOJ regards the
Anti-Deficiency Act as precluding federal PRPs from undertaking cleanups under
EPA's orders; second, federal PRPS generally prefer to obtain contribution protec-
tion through a judicial consent decree, rather than undertake work under an ad-
ministrative order; third, a unilateral order would subject a federal PRP to
statutory penalties for noncompliance-an exposure federal PRPs would prefer to
avoid.
40. See supra note 33 (noting instances where EPA and other federal PRPs
acted as opposing parties).
41. A principle component of EPA's enforcement strategy includes using uni-
lateral orders against PRPs who will not consent to perform response actions. The
Executive Order could easily be amended to allow EPA the direct use of CERCLA
§ 106 orders against federal PRPs without the requirement of DOJ concurrence.
20051
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Not only are federal PRPs insulated from direct administrative
or judical enforcement action by EPA but in formal settlement
agreements, federal PRPs receive more favorable terms than private
PRPs as a matter of policy.42 For example, federal PRPs may obtain
the benefits of contribution protection in settlements without bear-
ing the same burdens of responsibility for Superfund cleanups as
private PRPs.43 Settlements with federal PRPs typically contain no
penalties for late payment, as well as no cleanup obligations. 44 Fed-
eral PRPs have sometimes maintained that they cannot reimburse
EPA for investigative oversight costs pursuant to section 104(a) of
CERCLA, because such payments would constitute an unauthorized
augmentation of EPA's appropriations. 45 However, EPA attorneys
may point out that, rather than augmenting a federal agency's
budget, payment of EPA's oversight costs by a federal PRP satisfies a
legal liability under sections 104(a) (1) and 107(a) of CERCLA.46
The foregoing demonstrates that, although CERCLA makes no dis-
tinction as to liability between private parties and governmental en-
tities, in practice, federal PRPs can settle on more favorable terms
than private PRPs.
4 7
42. SeeJoint EPA/DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33 (explaining EPA enforce-
ment authority in CERCLA actions). For example, EPA and DOJ model language
applicable to federal PRPs in RD/RA settlements exempts federal PRPs from work
requirements and only requires payment by federal PRPs of costs as soon as rea-
sonably practicable, with mediation by DOJ in the event of nonpayment within 120
days. Id. Settling private PRPs are subject to work requirements (including sched-
ules), dates certain for payment of costs and stipulated penalties for consent de-
cree violations (including late payment) under EPA's model RD/RA consent
decree. See EPA Model CERCLA RD/RA Consent Decree (May 2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/mod-
rdra-cd.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
43. See CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 1913(f) (2000) (discussing statutory al-
lowance for cost recovery in private party suits). Federal PRPs generally take the
position that the Anti-Deficiency Act, which prohibits government employees from
entering into obligations in advance of Congressional appropriations, prevents
federal PRPs from performing work under CERCLA consent decrees. 31 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (a)(1) (1994). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. However, note that
federal PRPs as "settling federal agencies" have agreed to partially fund response
work performed by private PRPs. See, e.g., Rollins/AlliedSignal EPA Consent, supra
note 33 (approving consent decree).
44. SeeJoint EPA/DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33 (explaining that federal
PRP settlements do not involve payment of penalties or cleanup obligations).
45. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1) (2000) (describing government officers' and
employees' limited ability to "make or authorize" expenditures and obligations).
46. See CERCLA § 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2000) (requiring pay-
ment of oversight costs in settlements under CERCLA § 122 for conducting Reme-
dial Investigation or Feasibility Study); see also CERCIA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4) (2000) (imposing liability on certain parties for all costs incurred,
including oversight costs, by government, in cleaning up superfund site).
47. See CERCLA § 120(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1).
[Vol. XVI: p. .149
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/1
MANACLED OCTOPUS
The potential for favorable treatment of federal PRPs in settle-
ments can undermine settlement negotiations with private PRPs,
who expect that all PRPs will be treated equitably by the United
States and will pay their fair share of settlements. 48 There is, there-
fore, some basis in governmental policy for private PRPs to com-
plain that a governmental policy favorable to federal PRPs impedes
their efforts to hold other PRPs accountable in the Superfund pro-
cess. This can lead to the reluctance of private PRPs to settle for
past costs or undertake cleanups at sites with federal PRPs, owing to
a perception that the federal PRPs receive more favorable treat-
ment than private PRPs, even if that is not the case.
In order to assure the private regulated community that fed-
eral PRPs are receiving the same treatment as private PRPs, in addi-
tion to paying an appropriate share of response costs (with
premiums, if appropriate), federal PRPs can and should be subject
to the same disincentives for delaying settlement or avoiding pay-
ment under settlement agreements as private PRPs. Those disin-
centives could include the threat of prompt administrative or
judicial action if settlement is not forthcoming, and once settle-
ment is achieved, payment should follow by a certain date with stip-
ulated penalties for noncompliance. 49 Without such disincentives,
federal PRPs may not participate in settlement negotiations in a
timely and meaningful fashion.50
CERCLA § 120(a) (1) provides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States
(including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of govern-
ment) shall be subject to, and comply with, this Act in the same manner
and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any non-
governmental entity, including liability under section 107 of this Act.
Id.
48. See, e.g., Memorandum from Barry Breen, EPA (June 17, 1999) available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/neg-
enfst-mem.pdf (discussing settlements' effects favorable to federal PRPs); OSWER
Directive No. 9835.0; see also Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, Attachment XII, (Dec.
5, 1984) available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup
/superfund/cerc-settlmnt-mem.pdf (discussing outcome when federal PRPs are fa-
vorably treated).
49. See Joint EPA/DOJ Memorandum, supra note 33. As previously noted,
EPA is required to obtain DOJ approval before issuing administrative orders to
federal PRPs, effectively insulating them from direct administrative action. See
Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, § 4(e) (Jan. 23, 1987). EPA and DOJ
model consent decree language applicable to federal PRPs does not contain stipu-
lated penalties. See id.
50. Federal PRPs may be seen by private PRPs as having the same incentives
for delaying settlement as they do: by delaying payment, they gain an advantage
through the time value of money. But, in addition, private PRPs know that govern-
ment policy gives federal PRPs a greater ability to drag their feet than private PRPs
have. See supra note 48.
2005]
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Representation by DOJ of both EPA and a federal PRP in litiga-
tion forces DOJ attorneys to attempt to put forward a single unified
position on behalf of the government. 51 For example, a single DOJ
attorney may attend a deposition and question the witness on both
EPA's claims and a federal PRP's defenses. 52 DOJ has acknowl-
edged that because it represents parties on both sides, the possibil-
ity of taking inconsistent legal positions exists, but rather than allow
disputes between agencies to be aired in the courts, DOJ attempts
to minimize this conflict by allowing its attorneys to "trade legal
briefs and solicit each other's comments to give the government
one voice." 53
C. The Recent Aviall Supreme Court Decision
The position taken by the Solicitor General before the Su-
preme Court in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.54 is in-
structive, and provides a clear example of how the Unitary
Executive principle finds its expression in DOJ having to choose
between the interests of a client agency, such as EPA, and the op-
posing interests of other client federal agencies, in this case federal
PRPs.55 It should be recognized, however, that Aviall does not di-
rectly present the difficulties of dual representation by DOJ of an
enforcing agency and a defending agency which find themselves
adverse parties to the same litigation. Instead, Aviall presented the
government with a policy-making decision, arguably a situation ap-
propriate for intra-Executive resolution. Nevertheless, the Hob-
son's choice dictated by the Unitary Executive principle was a stark
one, and the results far-reaching. For that reason, Aviall deserves
close examination.
Respondent Aviall sought contribution under section
113(f)(1) of CERCLA, against Petitioner, Cooper, for certain ex-
penses Aviall incurred in cleaning up property it purchased from
51. See 23 Env't Rep.(BNA) 3328 (Apr. 30, 1993) (discussing EPA and DOJ
efforts to "cope" with CERCLA liability).
52. See id. at 3229 (noting DOJ's ability to represent multiple parties on gov-
ernment's behalf).
53. Id. at 3228-29 (summarizingj. Steven Rogers' comments to D.C. Bar Asso-
ciation). J. Steven Rogers is Assistant Chief of the Environmental Defense Section
of DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources Division. Id. He spoke before a
D.C. Bar Association session on April 22, 1993. Id.
54. See Aviall Serv., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), rev'd and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 577 (2004).
55. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Cooper Indus.,
Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 577 (2004) (No. 02-1192) (demonstrating Uni-
tary Executive principle).
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Cooper.5 6 The district court dismissed Aviall's contribution claim,
holding that Aviall could not maintain a section 113(f) (1) contribu-
tion action because the plain language of the statute required such
an action to be brought "during or following" an enforcement ac-
tion under CERCLA.5 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed, and Cooper sought certiorari.58 The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, upholding the district court's inter-
pretation of Section 113(f) (1) in favor of Cooper.59
56. Aviall, 125 S. Ct. at 586 (outlining Aviall's claim against Cooper). Al-
though Aviall also asserted a claim under CERCLA § 107(a), the Supreme Court
declined to address Aviall's claim that it may recover costs under § 107(a) (4) (B) in
the absence of briefing and decisions by the courts below, or to decide whether
Aviall has an implied right to contribution under § 107. See id.
57. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 55, at 8 (re-
jecting Aviall's CERCLA contribution claim).
58. See'Avial4 125 S. Ct. at 582-83 (reversing previous decision en banc by
divided vote).
59. See id. at 583-84 (deciding that CERCLA § 113(f)(1) did not authorize
Aviall's suit). Note that the effects of Aviall are already being felt in later CERCLA
cases. See, e.g., AMW Materials Testing, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 348 F. Supp. 2d 4
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that pursuant to Aviall, plaintiffs could not maintain
CERCLA § 113 contribution claim because they had incurred cleanup costs volun-
tarily); Elementis Chems., Inc. v. T H Agric. and Nutrition, L.L.C., No. 03 Civ.
5150(LBS), 2005 WL 236488 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2005) (holding that plaintiff had
no CERCLA § 107 claim to recover voluntary cleanup costs). After Aviall was de-
cided by the Supreme Court, plaintiff acknowledged in supplemental post-Aviall
brief that it had no § 113(f) claim because it had not been subject to §§ 106 or 107
action). In another case, a U.S. District Court found that respondent to EPA ad-
ministrative consent order did not have CERCLA § 113 claim for contribution be-
cause EPA'S consent order was not a settlement under CERCLA § 122. See
Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition LLC, No. 02-CV-0428 MJR, 2005
WL 615755 (S.D. Ill. 2005). Subsequently the court granted leave to amend com-
plaint to add a CERCLA § 107 claim. Id. Elsewhere, however, a U.S. District Court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment filed before Aviall was
decided and dismissed the plaintiffs' CERCLA § 113(f) claim. See E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 2d 740, 745 (D. NJ. 2004). This case
is currently on appeal to the Third Circuit. The plaintiffs are seeking reconsidera-
tion of Court of Appeals' previous rejection of § 107 suits for contribution. See
generally Appellant's Opening Brief, E. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States,
297 F. Supp. 2d 740 (D. N.J. 2004) (No. 04-2496) (Feb. 7, 2005). See also Adobe
Lumber v. Taecker, No. CV S02-186 GEB GGH (E.D. Ca. May 24, 2005) (citing
Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997);
Western Props. Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 685 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
private party may bring contribution action under § 107 of CERCLA because Su-
preme Court did not rule on issue therefore Ninth Circuit precedent governs).
The District Court noted that § 113 did not replace the § 107 implicit right to
contribution recognized by many courts; instead, the sections operate together for
contribution claims. Id. But see Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging dilemma created by Aviall decision for parties seeking contribu-
tion for voluntary cleanup costs if there is no mechanism for recovery until after
proceedings are brought against PRPs; remanding issue on plaintiff's eligibility to
sue under § 107(a) of CERCLA).
20051
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What makes this case unique is the interest taken in it by a
number of governmental and private entities, all of whom filed ami-
cus curiae briefs for the Respondent, Aviall, with the notable excep-
tion of the United States government.60 The predominate public
policy argument in these briefs was that private-sector cleanups
would be discouraged and delayed if the right of contribution
under CERCLA were restricted, frustrating both the interests of
CERCLA in cleaning up toxic waste sites and longstanding EPA pol-
icy favoring private-party cleanups. 61 One industry amicus brief
maintained that this would be the result if the right of contribution
were extinguished at sites where investigations and cleanups are
performed either voluntarily or under an EPA unilateral order:
The right of contribution is the sole mechanism that al-
lows the member companies of amici curiae to collect
from other liable parties their equitable shares of the
cleanup costs (note omitted). These member companies
frequently perform cleanups-either voluntarily or at the
request of government agencies-at sites where they are
responsible for only a small share of the contamination.
They agree to perform these cleanups, despite their rela-
tively small shares of liability, in reliance upon the right of
contribution, which allows them to compel other liable
parties to pay an equitable share of the cleanup costs. If
that right is restricted, these member companies will have
little reason to step forward and perform cleanups while
other companies that contaminated the same sites escape
liability.62
The state amici similarly stressed the importance of contribu-
tion actions in achieving the expeditious cleanup of Superfund
sites:
60. See generally Brief for Lockheed Martin Corp. as Amicus Curiae, Cooper In-
dus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 577 (2004) (No. 02-1192); Brief for
Superfund Settlements Project et al. as Amici Curiae, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall
Serv., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 577 (2004) (No. 02-1192); Brief for the State of New York et
al. as Amici Curiae, 125 S. Ct. 577 (2004) (No. 02-1192); Brief for Atlantic Rich-
field Co. et al. as Amici Curiae, 125 S. Ct. 577 (2004) (No. 02-1192). In all, twenty-
three states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, eight industry umbrella and trade
organizations and a number of interested corporations filed four separate amicus
curiae briefs in support of Aviall's position.
61. See id. (arguing against weakening CERCLA contribution rights on policy
grounds).
62. See Brief for Superfund Settlements Project et al. as Amici Curiae, supra
note 60, at 2-3 (emphasizing contribution rights' importance in Superfund
settlements).
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CERCLA provides a considerable incentive for PRPs to
enter into administrative or judicially approved settle-
ments with the States (or the United States). A party that
resolves its liability by way of such settlement benefits from
the ability to seek contribution from other PRPs under
[section] 113(f)(3)(B) .... As a practical matter, these in-
centives are critical to the smooth functioning of the ad-
ministrative process and the cleanup of many sites without
the burdens and expenses of litigation. 63
The Solicitor General, in lone opposition to the amicus curiae
briefs of industry and the states, filed an amicus brief in support of
the Petitioner, Cooper.64 The Solicitor General sought reversal, ar-
guing that the plain language of section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA
makes clear that a party may seek contribution under CERCLA only
"during or following" a civil action under section 106 or section
107(a). 65 The Court adopted this interpretation.
Why, one may ask, would DOJ elect to file an amicus brief advo-
cating a position potentially detrimental to EPA's policy interests,
unless its motivation was primarily the protection of federal PRPs
facing contribution claims? 6 6 It seems apparent that DOJ, charged
under the Unitary Executive principle with balancing the compet-
63. See Brief for the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Del-
aware, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, and the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico as Amici Curiae, at 2-3, Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Aviall Serv., Inc.,
125 S. Ct. 577 (2004) (No. 02-1192) (supporting Respondent).
64. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 55, at 1 (sup-
porting Petitioner).
65. See id. at 16-17. Although the Solicitor General maintained that the "plain
language" of § 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1), compelled a restrictive reading
of the right of contribution, it was necessary both to completely ignore the "sav-
ings" clause of 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1) (noting "[n]othing in this subsec-
tion shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in
the absence of a civil action under § 106 or § 107"), and the permissive language of
that subsection (stating "[a] ny person may seek contribution .. .during or follow-
ing any civil action under § 106 or § 107(a)") in order to reach that conclusion.
(Emphases added).
66. See id. Note that the Solicitor General also argued that § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a), did not provide an independent right of contribution and that a
§ 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1), action was not available to a respondent to a
§ 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606, unilateral administrative order. The Solicitor General has
thus already taken a position on the two issues unresolved by Avial both of which
are likely to come before the Court again: (1) whether a party can bring a contri-
bution action under § 107; and (2) whether a complying respondent to a § 106
unilateral administrative order can seek contribution under § 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C.
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ing policy interests of its client agencies, had determined to resolve
the conflict in favor of federal agency defense rather than EPA en-
forcement, with results which may, on balance, prove favorable to
the federal purse but not necessarily to environmental protection.
Yet it would seem that this conundrum, forcing the executive to
choose one public policy concern over another, is less constitution-
ally compelled than driven by a need to keep policy-making deci-
sions within the executive and out of the courts. In the Aviall
context, the argument for such executive control is more compel-
ling. In the context of CERCLA litigation involving federal PRPs, it
is arguably less so.
It is the thesis of this Article that in the CERCLA enforcement
context, where federal PRPs are involved, a truly strong executive
would search for a Solomonic solution - one which would allow its
agencies limited freedom to advance their own competing interests
in the public forum of the courts. In Aviall, EPA's voice was neces-
sarily silent.6 7 EPA's vital interests in CERCLA enforcement, as well
67. Note that before the Court, Mr. Minear did advance an EPA policy inter-
est: keeping remedy decisions in EPA's hands and out of the courts. Requiring
settlements as a prerequisite for contribution actions benefits the EPA, Mr. Minear
implied, because:
[b]y reaching a settlement with the Federal Government on - on the -
the details of the cleanup, it relieves a Federal court of having to make
that determination in a contribution action. As it stands right now in a
case such as this [a private party action for costs incurred in voluntary
cleanup], the Federal court is going to be forced to make the determina-
tion of whether or not there is compliance with the NCP. And that's a
highly technical issue and it's an issue that ought to be addressed in the
first instance by the Federal or State officials who are experts in these
matters. As it stands right now, if there is no extinguishment of the un-
derlying liability, the court is going to have to - the Federal courts are
going to have to resolve these issues without the guidance of those people
who are most knowledgeable on that very issue.
Transcript of Oral Argument ofJeffery P. Minear, in support of the United States,
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 577 (2004) (No. 02-1192) available
at 2004 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 51. This argument, however, only applies to contri-
bution actions brought after settlements under § 113(f) (3) (B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f) (3) (B) (2000). It ignores the possibility of remedy review or review of
issues relating to consistency with the National Contingency Plan (NCP) in ajudi-
cial enforcement action which Mr. Minear argued was required to trigger a contri-
bution action under § 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Also, it overlooks the
statutory requirement for record review of remedy decisions, under which EPA's
choice of remedy is afforded judicial deference. See CERCLA § 113(j)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(j) (2), providing "in any judicial action under this Act, the Court
shall uphold the President's decision in selecting the response action unless the
objecting party can demonstrate, on the administrative record, that the decision
was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law." CERCLA
§ 113(j)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2). Finally, it overlooks the opportunity the
United States would have of intervening on behalf of EPA in any private CERCLA
contribution litigation as an interested party under FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a). See gener-
ally United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v.
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as the public's interest in obtaining expeditious cleanup of
Superfund sites, were advanced by industry and the states' attorneys
general, but not by the Solicitor General. While this sacrifice may
have been unavoidable in the policy-making context, in the more
limited and fact-specific context of EPA enforcement litigation in-
volving federal PRPs it is possible that such a Hobson's choice can
be avoided.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INTERAGENCY DISPUTES
The Unitary Executive principle holds that disputes between
parties in the same branch of the government are not justiciable
because they do not satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of
Article III of the Constitution.68 A related argument is that Article
II, the Separation of Powers Clause, precludes suits between execu-
tive agencies because the President, and not individual administra-
tive agencies, has the constitutionally assigned power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed. 69 However, Articles II and III do not
explicitly prohibit intra-executive litigation, and this interpretation
of the Unitary Executive principle may be a mechanical one that
elevates form over substance. 70 It appears doubtful that there are
strict Constitutional barriers to such litigation. 71
To meet the Article III requirement for a real case or contro-
versy, there must be adverse parties and a dispute before the court
that is of a type that has traditionally been decided by the courts. 72
It is an established principle that one may not sue oneself, because
in such a case there would not be adverse parties. 73 However,
courts will look beyond the names of the parties to determine
Acton Corp., 131 F.R.D. 431 (D. N.J. 1990) (noting non-settling PRP's interest in
contribution sufficient to sustain intervention under both CERCLA and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
68. See U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power to cases and
controversies).
69. See U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3 (mandating President shall "take care" to en-
sure that laws are "faithfully executed").
70. See generally Sunstein, supra note 3 (addressing presidential oversight in
administrative process).
71. See Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal Agencies?, 17 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 317, 324-53 (1990) (arguing no constitutional barrier prohibits EPA from
suing federal agencies in court to enforce environmental law). See also Herz, supra
note 10, at 896-99 (outlining arguments concerning justiciable intra-governmental
suits).
72. See U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (setting forth "case or controversy"
requirement).
73. See Herz, supra note 10, at 894 (pointing to both precedent and constitu-
tional language supporting adverse party principle).
2005]
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whether a case or controversy exists.74 Historically, courts have per-
mitted the United States to be on both sides of a lawsuit because
the courts have emphasized the nature of the issue to be litigated,
rather than the nominal identity of the parties. 75 In United States v.
Interstate Commerce Commission (Interstate Commerce Commission)76, the
Supreme Court held that one must focus on the issues raised to
determine if a controversy is justiciable. 77
It may be argued, however, that while suits between indepen-
dent agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), and executive agencies may be cognizable by the courts,
EPA is an agency within the Executive Branch and is therefore not
entitled to litigate against other agencies. Disputes between agencies
within the Executive Branch, in this view, are not justiciable be-
cause there can be no controversy within the Executive Branch,
which is headed by one person.78
Another argument in favor of the Unitary Executive principle
is that the separation of powers clause in Article II, which vests exec-
utive authority in one person, would be undermined if the courts
provided a forum for disputes between executive agencies. 79 This
interpretation of the Unitary Executive assumes that the President
resolves all disputes in the Executive Branch.80 However, agency
74. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693-94 (1974) (deciding courts
must look beyond caption to determine disputes' justiciability); United States v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949) (illustrating same princi-
ple). See generally Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1874) (discussing
federal courts' powers); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 692, 697 (Cl.
Ct. 1987) (concluding that dispute between two executive agencies was justicia-
ble); Dean v. Herrington, 668 F. Supp. 646, 651 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (finding suit
between two executive agencies justiciable).
75. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. at 430 (emphasizing need to look
beyond parties' names when determining jusiticiability).
76. 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
77. See id. (citing holding of case). But see Dir., Office of Workers' Comp.
Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S.
122, 128 (1995) (discussing how government's different roles in litigation may af-
fect justiciability). For example, the Court noted "the status of the Government as
a statutory beneficiary or market participant must be sharply distinguished from
the status of the Government as regulator or administrator." Id. at 128-29.
78. See, e.g., Mackie v. Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144, 146-47 (D.D.C. 1993) (discuss-
ing intra-executivejusticiability). DOJ has also at times taken the position that not
even independent agencies, such as the Postal Service, can litigate against other
federal agencies. See id.
79. See U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1 (vesting executive power in President). See also
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 38 (Jan. 1994) (discussing President's duties as outlined in
Constitution).
80. See Lessig and Sunstein, supra note 79, at 38 (discussing relationship be-
tween Article II's Voting Clause and Opinions Clause).
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heads often have their own decision-making authority, which is con-
stitutionally vested by Congress or delegated by the President.81
Within the Executive Branch, there are several examples of non-
presidential control.8 2 For example, the President lacks the author-
ity to remove independent counsel and civil service employees.8 3
The broad purpose of the Unitary Executive principle is to en-
sure the "unity and coordination in executive administration [that
is] essential to effective action."8 4 However, the federal courts are
not uniform in finding that the judiciary is constitutionally barred
from reviewing intra-executive lawsuits.8 5 In United States v. Nixon,8 6
the Supreme Court noted that "mere assertion of a claim of an 'in-
tra branch dispute,' without more, has never operated to defeat fed-
eraljurisdiction. ''87 As with Interstate Commerce Commission, the Nixon
Court ruled that the status of the contested issue as a traditional
case or controversy, not the status of the parties, determined
whether the case was justiciable.88 In so ruling, the Court elimi-
nated Article II's separation of powers clause from its inquiry.8 9 In-
stead, it focused solely upon whether the case presented an Article
III case or controversy, susceptible to judicial resolution.90 To de-
termine adverseness, the Court looked to the facts or "setting" of
the case and concluded that the conflicting positions taken by the
81. See id. at 37 (comparing Presidential and Congressional appointment
powers).
82. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 656 (1988) (holding restriction
of Attorney General's power to remove Independent Counsel to instances of "good
cause" not violation of separation of powers). See also generally Nathan v. Smith,
737 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that Independent Counsel may only be
removed for good cause shown by Attorney General).
83. See generally Smith, 737 F.2d 1069 (noting that good cause threshold to
remove Independent Counsel ensured Independent Counsel's independence).
84. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (offering dicta that im-
plicitly recognized President's adherence to Unitary Executive principle). The
Court also implied that the President has authority to review the actions of other
executive agency officials. Id.
85. See id. at 108 (discussing whether Article I grants President independent
power to remove executive agency officials).
86. 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974). See also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696 (upholding
independent counsel provisions in Ethics in Government Act).
87. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693. In interagency litigation involving EPA, the D.C.
Circuit determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction in two challenges
brought by the Department of Agriculture to EPA pesticide restrictions. See, e.g.,
Envt'l Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envt'l Prot. Agency, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Envt'l
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envt'l Prot. Agency, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
88. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 697 (noting suits are not rendered nonjusticiable
simply because both parties are Executive Agency officials).
89. See id. (stating all federal criminal prosecutions fall under Article III).
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Special Prosecutor and the President presented that "concrete ad-
verseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
Court... largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."91
In accordance with the test established by Interstate Commerce
Commission and Nixon, CERCLA cases involving recalcitrant federal
PRPs present: (1) traditionally justiciable disputes; (2) in a setting
which assures "concrete adverseness" of the parties. 92 EPA, as the
agency charged with enforcing environmental laws, routinely has
an adversarial relationship with its regulated community, which in-
cludes federal agencies within the Executive Branch. EPA's inter-
ests in protecting public health and the environment are adverse to
any federal agency that has allegedly contaminated the environ-
ment and from whom EPA seeks penalties, injunctive relief or
restitution.
Unlike other types of controversies between agencies that may
involve questions concerning overlapping jurisdiction or policy, dis-
putes between EPA and federal PRPs are fundamentally adversarial.
The federal PRP at a private-party site does not behave in any way as
a regulator or as an agency co-equal to EPA with potentially shared
decision-making or policy authority; it is merely one PRP among
many. The financial stakes in CERCLA litigation are high, so PRPs
faced with such liability exposure engage in extensive third-party
practice in an effort to lower that exposure. In addition, factual
issues requiring resolution in a CERCLA case are much more com-
plex than those presented in other environmental regulatory con-
texts. CERCLA cases, for example, may involve hundreds of
parties, each presenting unique problems of proof as well as unique
defenses.
Since Nixon was decided, federal courts have followed the two-
prong test in determining whether inter-agency disputes are justici-
able. In United States v. Federal Maritime Commission,93 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that a suit brought by the Antitrust Division of DOJ to challenge the
Commission's approval of certain pooling agreements between
shippers was justiciable. 94 In finding that the Article III "case or
controversy" prerequisite to jurisdiction was met, the court stated:
91. See id. at 697 (noting Article III case or controversy requirement was not
satisfied if parties not adverse).
92. See id. (discussing general requirements for justiciability).
93. 694 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
94. See id. at 799-801 (describing Court's justiciability analysis and applying
Interstate Commerce Commission/Nixon test).
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[T]he structure of the government of the United States
permits cases and controversies to arise between separate
agencies .... This dispute over the validity of a Commis-
sion order raises issues that courts traditionally resolve and
the setting assures the concrete adverseness on which
sharpened presentation of the issues is thought to de-
pend. The parties' controversy is justiciable. 95
The Executive Branch itself has been inconsistent in applica-
tion of the Unitary Executive principle. 96 For example, in Shoreham-
Wading River Central School District v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion,97 DOJ filed a brief against the United States government. 98 In
that case, petitioners sought a stay of an order of the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC), until the NRC complied with the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act and filed an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS).99 In its brief, DOJ acknowledged that while it
would usually join in the NRC's response to the petitioners' chal-
lenge, in this instance, because the Department of Energy and
Council on Environmental Quality would also argue for the need to
file an EIS, it would join with the petitioners and urge the stay of
the NRC order.'00
A fundamental tenet of the Unitary Executive principle is that
it ensures uniform execution of the laws, which is clearly the duty of
the Chief Executive. 1 1 However, as noted above, specific agencies
are, in most instances, the actual executors of the laws. 102 There
would continue to be unitary execution of environmental laws if
there were litigation between EPA, as a regulatory agency, and a
federal agency subject to EPA regulation. EPA would retain its au-
thority as the sole agency executing environmental laws, subject to
95. See id. at 809-10. See also United States v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 655 F.2d 247,
252 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that suit raised issues traditionally resolved by courts
and that "setting" ensures "adverseness").
96. See generally Shoreham-Wading River Cent. Sch. Dist. v. United States Nu-
clear Regulatory Comm'n, 971 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (dismissing case involving
two executive agencies).
97. 501 U.S. 1267 (1991).
98. See Shoreham-Wading River Cent. Sch. Dist. v. United States Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Comm'n, No. 90-1241, 1991 WL 64881 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting attorneys'
appearances and briefs filed).
99. See generally id. (discussing plaintiffs' desired outcome).
100. See id. (noting DOJ supported NRC order).
101. See U.S. CoNsT. Art. II, § 3 (providing "take care" clause).
102. See Lessig and Sunstein, supra note 79, at 39-41 (commenting on agency
decision-making authority granted by Congress or President).
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judicial review, while a federal PRP would retain its authority to de-
fend against any such enforcement action.
The federal courts have not always deferred to the United
States government's interpretation of the Unitary Executive princi-
ple. 103 For example, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction that prevented
the President from removing members of the Board of Governors
of the Postal Service so that the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit could decide an action brought by
the Board (over the express wishes of the Attorney General and a
Presidential directive) against the Postal Rate Commission concern-
ing a rate-making dispute. 10 4 In a similar sense, it could be argued
that the Unitary Executive principle imposes no legal barriers to
judicial enforcement of CERCLA by EPA against federal PRPs.10 5
V. THE ETHICS OF DUAL REPRESENTATION
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, it is not at all clear
that the Constitution precludes federal agencies as distinct entities
from airing their differences in court or taking administrative ac-
tion against other agencies, where authorized by statute. Congress
has mandated that CERCLA is to be applied equally to the federal
government when it behaves as a regulated entity.10 6 Yet, such
equal treatment is called into question when both EPA and the reg-
ulated federal agencies are represented by common counsel.
Although there are arguments to the contrary, the potential of
a conflict of interest exists in CERCLA cases when DOJ is forced to
represent EPA in an enforcement capacity and another federal
agency in a defensive capacity. The American Bar Association
(ABA) has promulgated the Model Rules of Professional Con-
103. See generally Mackie v. Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1993) (deciding suit
between Justice Department and United States Postal Service).
104. See id. (noting justiciability problems in suit between two entities within
United States Postal Service). In an effort to prevent the Board from going for-
ward with its lawsuit against the Commission, DOJ, in an October 27, 1992 letter to
the Chairman of the Board, asserted that the Postal Service had no independent
litigation authority. The District Court noted that although the question of its
jurisdiction to hear the injunction action was not entirely clear under existing pre-
cedent, it deferred to the D.C. Circuit, and determined that the underlying contro-
versy should be heard. See id. at 146.
105. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 3, at 303 (discussing federal government's
prosecution powers).
106. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§9601(21), 9606(b), 9607(a), 9609, 9620(a)(1)
(2000) (applying CERCLA requirements to federal PRPs).
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duct'0 7 and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,' 0 8 which
include canons of ethics, ethical considerations and disciplinary
rules. Model Rule 1.7 addresses loyalty to a client and is the princi-
ple provision governing conflicts of interest. 10 9 In its comments to
Model Rule 1.7, the ABA states:
[L] oyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation
directly adverse to that client without that client's consent....
Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a
person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if
it is wholly unrelated. . . .Loyalty to a client is also im-
paired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or
carry out an appropriate course of action for the client
because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or inter-
ests. ... Consideration should be given to whether the client
wishes to accommodate the other interests involved.
110
Model Rule 1.7 applies to both actual and potential conflicts of in-
terest."' Although the mere potential for conflict does not abso-
lutely preclude representation, if an actual conflict exists, the
lawyer must analyze "whether it will materially interfere with the
lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alterna-
tives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pur-
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983).
108. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1982).
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983). In its entirety, Rule 1.7
states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that cli-
ent will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad-
versely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that cli-
ent may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to an-
other client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests,
unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is under-
taken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications
of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
Id.
110. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. (1983) (emphasis added) (discussing loyalty to client).
111. See id. (distinguishing between conflict types).
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sued on behalf of the client." 112 When describing conflicts in
litigation, the ABA also states:
An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of sub-
stantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompati-
bility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the
fact that there are substantially different possibilities of set-
tlement of the claims or liabilities in question. 113
Virtually identical conflict rules govern law firms and lawyers
employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organi-
zation, so that even if different attorneys in the same organization
separately represent clients with adverse interests, the conflict may
still be imputed to all attorneys in the organization. Model Rule
1.10114 is intended to prevent law firms from undertaking represen-
tation of multiple clients with adverse interests, thus creating an im-
permissible conflict of interest.115 The ABA has commented that
Rule 1.10 is premised on the fact that "a firm of lawyers is essentially
one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the cli-
ent... [therefore] each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obliga-
tions of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is
associated."' 16 Thus, the Rule may be interpreted to disqualify DOJ
from representing the interests of both EPA and a federal PRP in
the same CERCLA enforcement action, even if separate DOJ attor-
neys are assigned to each agency, because no DOJ attorney should
represent EPA if any other DOJ attorney is representing a client
agency whose interests are adverse to EPA's.1 17
However, Model Rule 1.7 would permit an attorney to re-
present multiple parties if the interests of each can adequately be repre-
sented, and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure.
Thus, there are two prongs to be satisfied: first, each client's inter-
ests must be adequately represented, and second, each must con-
sent to the representation. As to the latter, under existing
112. See id. (describing critical questions lawyers should ask themselves when
faced with potential conflict).
113. Id. (explaining how conflicts can be found in litigation context).
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (1983). Model Rule 1.10 pro-
vides: "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly re-
present a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from
doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2." Id.
115. See id. (dealing with multiple clients being represented by same firm).
116. See id. R. 1.10 cmt. (explaining basis for Rule 1.10 and principle of im-
puted disqualification).
117. See id. (noting possibility of disqualification if one firm represents both
parties, even if protective measures are taken such as assigning separate attomeys).
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governmental policy, one may argue that both EPA and federal PRP
agencies have consented to such representation. 1 8 However, as to
the first prong, even if EPA consented, the proposition that an at-
torney or a potentially conflicted organization can represent both a
plaintiff and a defendant in the same matter, even under circum-
stances of full disclosure and consent, has received some
criticism.1 19
There are a number of cases at the state level where courts
have found conflicts of interest when a state Attorney General rep-
resents state entities with adverse interests.120 In Motor Club of Iowa
v. Department of Transportation,'21 the state Attorney General sought
to override the interests of the State Department of Transportation
and pursue a lawsuit on behalf of the State of Iowa.122 The court
observed that:
An attorney general should not seek to perform his duty
to represent a department of state government where the
goals of the department conflict with what the attorney
general believes is the state interest. State officers and
state departments of government deserve adequate legal
representation. No representation can be adequate unless
it is without conflicts on the part of counsel .... To ac-
cord the attorney general the power he claims would leave
118. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987) (designat-
ing natural resource trustees).
119. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrIY EC 5-15, n.19 (1982) (citing
Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
966 (1958)) (dealing with interests of multiple clients). "[M]anifestly, there are
instances where the conflicts of interest are so critically adverse as not to admit of
one attorney's representing both sides .... No one could conscionably contend
that the same attorney may represent both the plaintiff and defendant in an adver-
sary action." Id.
120. See, e.g., City of York v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 295 A.2d 825, 831 (Pa.
1972) (denying Attorney General's request that Pennsylvania intervene as appel-
lant against defendant, state agency); see also Teleco, Inc. v. Corp. Comm'n of
Okla., 649 P.2d 772, 773 (Okla. 1982) (denying attorney permission to intervene
in opposition to state agency but suggesting such intervention might be allowed
where public interest was unrepresented and agency could be represented by inde-
pendent counsel); see also Amerland v. Hagan, 175 N.W. 372, 374 (N.D. 1919) (de-
nying Attorney General's motion to strike state agency's answer filed without
consulting Attorney General); see also Waigand v. City of Nampa, 133 P.2d 738, 741
(Idaho 1943) (finding authority for government entity to retain independent
counsel); see also Ariz. State Land Dep't v. McFate, 348 P.2d 912, 918 (Ariz. 1960)
(refusing to permit attorney general to challenge agency action).
121. See 251 N.W.2d 510, 511 (Iowa 1977) (holding Attorney General does
not have authority to continue prosecution of appeal against wishes of client and
Department).
122. See id. at 511-13 (noting reason for state Attorney General's claim).
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all branches and agencies of government deprived of ac-
cess to the court except by his grace and with his consent.
In a most fundamental sense such departments and agen-
cies would thereby exist and ultimately function only
through him. 123
In addition, an attempt by the National Association of Attor-
neys General to exempt government lawyers from the Model Rules
governing conflicts of interest was flatly rejected by the ABA. 124
The ABA has noted that a lawyer representing a government agency
is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohi-
bition against representing adverse interests in Rule 1.7.125 Never-
theless, in the comments to Model Rule 1.7, the ABA notes that
there may be circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate
against a client:
For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with di-
verse operations may accept employment as an advocate
against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so
will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the
enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients con-
sent upon consultation. By the same token government
lawyers in some circumstances may represent government
employees in proceedings in which a government agency
is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent repre-
sentation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For
example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree
not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concern-
ing statutory interpretation. 126
The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules discusses the unique
position of government lawyers, such as attorneys general, who may
have settlement authority that private lawyers do not automatically
have absent client's permission. 127 The ABA notes that "lawyers
123. See id. at 515-16 (explaining why Attorney General cannot always provide
adequate counsel to government agencies).
124. See William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government
Lauyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.J. 539, 543 n.15
(1986) (noting unsuccessful attempt by National Association of Attorneys General
to exempt government attorneys from conflict of interest rules).
125. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.11 (1983) (specifying that gov-
ernment attorneys are subject to Rule 1.7).
126. See id. R. 1.7, cmt. (noting joint representation is permitted under cer-
tain circumstances).
127. See id. preamble (noting special circumstances affecting representation
by government attorneys).
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under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to re-
present several governmental agencies in intra-governmental legal
controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not re-
present multiple private clients .... These Rules do not abrogate
such authority. 1
28
Federal courts, in dicta, have indicated that in certain circum-
stances conflicts of interest do exist and may prevent DOJ from ade-
quately representing its federal clients. 129 For example, in State of
Colorado v. U.S. Department of the Army,130 Colorado sued the Depart-
ment of the Army (represented by DOJ/Defense), seeking an in-
junction to halt alleged violations of Colorado's Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)-based environmental laws
in connection with cleanup of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, a facil-
ity owned by the Army.131 DOJ/Enforcement, at the same time,
represented EPA in a consolidated CERCLA action involving pri-
vate PRPs, Colorado and the Army (which was again represented by
DOJ/Defense). 132 In denying the Army's motion to dismiss the
State's RCRA complaint, the District Court of Colorado held that
the United States' pending CERCLA suit did not preclude the
128. See id. (permitting government lawyers to represent multiple agencies,
where private lawyer could not represent multiple clients). The fact that ABA has
affirmatively stated that rules of conflict apply to government lawyers, but has also
stated that the Model Rules do not prevent duly authorized government attorneys
from representing multiple agencies, suggests that the ABA may not have fully
resolved the conflict of interest issue as far as government lawyers are concerned.
Note that Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 516, provides that "conduct of all litigation in which
the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party ... is reserved by statute
exclusively to the Department of'Justice." See also 28 U.S.C. § 519 (2000). Further,
both 28 U.S.C. §§ 516 and 519 are prefaced by the phrase: "[e]xcept as otherwise
authorized by law." 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519. Thus, an express reservation of litiga-
tion authority to EPA by statutory amendment, as is the case in parts of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7605, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1366, and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9, would authorize inde-
pendent agency representation. However, it has been observed that if Congress
puts DOJ on both sides of a dispute through a statutory scheme, the government
must abide by Congress' mandate. See Nev. v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128
(1983) (finding government must perform obligations to represent Indian tribes
and other interests as well).
129. See, e.g., Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562,
1570 (D. Colo. 1989) (mentioning DOJ attorneys repeatedly denied conflict of
interest existed). See also United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1083
(D. Colo. 1985) (holding that no inter-agency dispute existed in this case).
130. See generally 707 F. Supp 1562 (D.Colo. 1989), rev'd and remanded, Colorado
v. United States Dep't of the Army, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993) (bringing action
against US Army to comply with certain state ground water rules).
131. See id. at 1563 (summarizing procedural history).
132. See id. at 1564 (describing case consolidation of two CERCLA cases in-
volving cleanup of same site).
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State's RCRA-based enforcement suit against the Army.133 The
court observed, however, that DOJ's conflicting interests impeded
both the conduct of the litigation as well as cleanup efforts.1 34 In
addition, the court stated that agreements reached between entities
with conflicting interests represented by DOJ may be suspect:
Since it is the E.P.A.'s job to achieve a cleanup as quickly
and thoroughly as possible, and since the Army's obvious
financial interest is to spend as little money and effort as
possible on the cleanup, I cannot imagine how one attor-
ney can vigorously and wholeheartedly advocate both posi-
tions. For this reason, among others, I have been
reluctant to approve the proposed 'consent decree,' which
is fundamentally an agreement between the two polluters,
the Army and Shell, to restrict future uses of Arsenal land
and thereby limit cleanup standards, thus lowering costs
for both defendants.13 5
In resolving a discovery dispute related to the Love Canal litiga-
tion, United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., the District
Court for the Western District of New York commented upon a pos-
sible conflict where DOJ was charged with representing both EPA
and the Department of the Army.136 In granting defendant Occi-
dental Chemical Corporation's motion to compel discovery against
the Army concerning the Army's disposal of hazardous substances,
the District Court questioned DOJ's ability to represent both EPA
and the Army simultaneously. 137 The District Court stated that "the
steps taken by the Department ofJustice... reflect what appears to
have been an almost naive approach to the possible conflicts be-
133. See id. at 1569-70 (finding CERCLA actually preserves state enforce-
ment).
134. See id. at 1570 (concluding conflict of interest caused lack of vigorous
advocacy, which was contrary to public interest). It should be noted that in Shell
Oi the District Court denied defendant Shell's motion to join Army as a defen-
dant, after applying the Nixon and ICC two-step test and finding that no justiciable
"case or controversy" under Article III existed. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1083.
135. Dep't. of Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1570 (commenting on potential conflict
presented when DOJ represents both parties). The District Court criticized EPA
for being unable to objectively monitor or enforce against federal polluters, stating
that where both EPA and a federal PRP are represented in a CERCLA action by
the "same Justice Department lawyers ... there is no vigorous independent advo-
cate for the public interest." Id.
136. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp, 136 F.R.D. 559, 566-
67 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting possible conflicts of interest).
137. See id. (discussing conflict of interest at issue).
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tween its litigation interests and responsibilities and those of the
Army."1 38
On the other hand, there are cases in which courts have found
dual representation by DOJ is not an actual conflict of interest. 139
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States,140 the United States
appealed an order disqualifying DOJ and the United States Attor-
ney from representing four individual co-defendants under Discipli-
nary Rules 5-105(A) and 5-105(B) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility adopted by the North Carolina State Bar. 41 The
case arose from an Eastern Airlines crash, where the individual de-
fendants were air traffic controllers on duty at the time of the
crash. 142 Plaintiff insurance companies paid $25 million in settle-
ments arising from the crash, and filed suit against the United
States and the traffic controllers to recover those costs. 143
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that in dis-
qualifying DOJ, the District Court erred, and reversed.1 44 It stated
the "mere existence of multiple defendants" does not inevitably cre-
ate a conflict of interest. 145 The court emphasized that there was no
dispute among representatives of DOJ or the controllers "either with
respect to their duties and responsibilities or the details of the
plane crash."'146 The circuit court was also influenced by the insur-
ance company's apparent motivation to "fragmentize the defense"
rather than "any sensitivity" on their part "to the ethical considera-
tions involved," and the court was influenced as well by the undis-
puted fact that there was "little or no possibility that the four
controllers [would] incur any personal liability" because they acted
138. See id. at 567 (setting forth District Court's rationale). See also United
States v. City of Glen Cove, Wah Chang Smelting & Refining Co. of Am., Inc., 221
F.R.D. 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). In City of Glen Cove, the intervener's rights were com-
promised because federal PRPs and EPA were represented by common DOJ coun-
sel. Id. "[T]his Court . . . finds that [Intervener's] contribution interest is
adequate to sustain intervention in this case. This result is particularly appropriate
under the instant set of facts, where as here, the federal government was on both
sides of the negotiation table and essentially reached a settlement agreement with
itself." Id. at 373.
139. SeeAetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). (noting cases where such conflicts did not exist).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1199 (stating grounds for United State's appeal).
142. See id. (noting case originated from airline crash).
143. See id. (detailing insurance companies' attempt to recover payments
made as result of airline crash).
144. See Aetna, 570 F.2d at 1200-01 (discussing District Court error and rever-
sal of District Court decision).
145. See id. at 1201 (noting rationale for reversing lower court decision).
146. See id. (noting factors used in deciding outcome of case).
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in the course and scope of their employment, and a judgment
against the United States would bar entry of a judgment against
them.' 47 Canon Five was designed to protect only the interests of
the clients affected by a conflict, and therefore, the circuit court
stated that the impact on plaintiffs was "irrelevant."1 48 Yet, the
Aetna case suggests that if the interests of the United States and the
controllers had been adverse, then the Fourth Circuit might have
found a conflict of interest.149
Several bar association ethical committees have opined, citing
Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, that, where the relationship between a governing body
and one of its agencies has become antagonistic, counsel fully inde-
pendent of the government should be retained to represent that
agency.' 50 Prior United States Attorneys General have endorsed
the notion that, as a matter of general policy, the Justice Depart-
ment should permit agencies with which it disagrees to present
their positions in court.'5 '
Equal treatment of private and federal PRPs may be ques-
tioned when both EPA and federal PRPs are represented by DOJ.
Although the law is not clear, an argument may be made that the
potential of a conflict of interest exists in such cases. The ABA
Model Rules appear to sanction such representation where client
agencies can be said to receive adequate representation and have
"consented" to dual representation. Whether these conditions have
been satisfied in any given case may be highly fact-specific. The
ABA has, however, also taken note of the unique position of govern-
ment lawyers, who may be authorized by law to represent several gov-
ernmental agencies in intra-governmental litigation.
147. See id. (noting factors that influenced Fourth Circuit's decision).
148. See id. at 1200-01 n.7 (pointing out that purpose of Canon Five was to
protect clients affected by conflicts of interests, not other parties).
149. See Aetna, 570 F.2d at 1200 (noting that Fourth Circuit found "nothing in
the record to support the conclusion ... that 'an actual conflict exists."').
150. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof]l Responsibility, Informal Op.
1282 (1973) (stating no attorney in corporate counsel's office may represent both
sides in suit brought by city against its police force); see also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
Comm'n on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 447 (1976) (reinforcing conflict of representing
both sides of suit).
151. SeeJosephson & Pearce, supra note 124 at 549-50 (discussing Attorney
General's view that DOJ should permit agencies to set forth their opposing
opinions).
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V. TOWARDS A STRONGER EXECUTIVE: SEVERAL PROPOSALS
A. Independent Litigation Authority
Although Congress could grant separate and independent au-
thority enabling EPA to represent itself in CERCLA enforcement
actions involving federal PRPs, it has not done so despite a series of
CERCIA amendments over the years. 152 However, Congress has
granted independent litigation authority to other federal enti-
ties. 153 For example, Congress justified the creation of the Con-
sumer Products Safety Commission as an agency within the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA),154 giving this agency independent
litigation authority, as follows:
It is important that the litigation of the Agency, which is
critical to enforcement of the laws it administers, be di-
rected and controlled by the Administrator. No one else
has the responsibility for enforcement of those laws, and
no one else should be in the position to frustrate their
enforcement .... Similarly, the decision as to what legal
arguments are to be made and how to make them most
effectively for orderly development of the law through
trial and appellate litigation is best handled by the Admin-
istrator who is responsible solely for enforcing the food,
drug and product safety laws. 155
Congress has also granted independent litigation authority to
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Securities and Ex-
152. See supra note 18. Consistent with such a grant, the Agency might re-
quest rescission of the portion of Executive Order 12,580 which requires DOJ to
approve the issuance of a § 106 Order. See Exec. Order 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923,
§ 4(e) (Jan. 23, 1987). Also note that independent representation authority is dis-
tinct from the more limited "overfile authority" now available (but seldom if ever
used) under some environmental statutes. An example of "overfile" authority is
that granted to EPA under § 7605 of the Clean Air Act, which requires the Admin-
istrator to request the Attorney General to appear and represent the Administra-
tor. See 42 U.S.C. § 7605 (2000). That section further provides that unless "the
Attorney General notifies the Administrator that he will appear in such action,
within a reasonable time, attorneys appointed by the Administrator shall appear
and represent him." See 42 U.S.C. § 7605 (a).
153. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 2061 (2000) (providing independent litigation
authority to Consumer Products Safety Commission).
154. See id. (setting forth creation of Consumer Products Safety Commission
within FDA).
155. Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, S. REP No. 92-835, at 4853 (1972),
as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573.
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change Commission (SEC), the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).156
It is widely recognized that EPA's willingness to enforce CER-
CLA's joint and several liability provisions serves as a principal set-
tlement incentive for private PRPs.1 57 EPA has been successful at
sites involving only private PRPs by pursuing an enforcement strat-
egy that serves to deter PRPs from "lying in the weeds."1 58 Al-
though a Congressional grant of independent litigation authority
might strengthen this policy, as a practical matter such a step is
unlikely to happen. However, intra-executive measures could be
pursued consistent with existing policy, which can be implemented
with minimum disruption to current practices and procedures.
B. Staff-level Firewalls
A more modest proposal, arguably consistent with the Unitary
Executive principle because it preserves the function of DOJ man-
agement as executive mediator of inter-agency disputes, is the es-
tablishment of staff-level "firewalls" between opposing government
counsel in CERCLA litigation involving federal PRPs.159 Such a
proposal could be instituted either as a matter of general govern-
ment policy, to be applied in all CERCLA enforcement cases involv-
ing federal PRPs, or on a case-by-case basis depending on the
degree of the federal PRP agency's involvement and the degree of
adverseness between the positions of the enforcing and defending
agencies. Such firewalls would allow agency and DOJ counsel the
freedom to advocate independently in negotiations and in court,
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000) (granting litigation authority to NLRB); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)(2) (2000) (granting authority to EEOC); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(t),
78(u) (2000) (granting authority to SEC); 49 U.S.C. § 1810(b) (2005) (granting
authority to DOT); 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (2000) (granting authority to ICC). However,
note that such independent authority does not necessarily equate to inter-agency
litigation authority.
157. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 177-78, (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
that joint and several liability was imposed on non-settling defendants, but 35
other PRPs settled).
158. See, e.g., Breen, supra note 48 (noting EPA success in pursuing enforce-
ment strategy with respect to PRPs); see also Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, supra
note 48 (noting general strategy to ensure timely cleanups).
159. The term derives from the language of computer security. While sever-
ing computer links between two sides of a law firm representing adverse clients is
one aspect of "fire" walls, a true "firewall" would prohibit all communication and
information-sharing relating to the lawsuit at issue, except those which are a mat-
ter of public record in the litigation between attorneys in the same firm represent-
ing adverse interests. A CERCLA firewall at the staff level, of the type proposed
herein, would therefore be somewhat less restrictive than a true firewall as those
terms are generally understood by the private legal community.
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but would allow DOJ management to resolve certain issues inter-
nally without public airing. A staff-level firewall would address a
number of issues identified above.
Staff-level firewalls would allow all government counsel to con-
duct discovery, motion practice and other litigation independently
(and hopefully more effectively) on behalf of their respective fed-
eral clients. This would ensure that DOJ trial attorneys have their
respective clients' best interests at heart in every aspect of litigation,
without having to balance the competing interests of other agencies
at every step. In litigation and settlement negotiations, for exam-
ple, one DOJ attorney would be able to concentrate exclusively on
EPA's affirmative case, without also having to protect the interests
of any involved federal PRPs at the same time. Such firewalls would
also provide procedures for shielding from disclosure potential in-
tra-governmental disputes which do not require adjudication or
which would not contribute meaningfully to settlement negotia-
tions with the private PRPs if disclosed.
As noted above, this proposal could be instituted at the govern-
mental staff level as a matter of policy or on a case-by-case basis. 160
Its essential feature would be to create an effective barrier at the
staff level between opposing governmental interests in a particular
case. It would require firewalls between enforcement and defense
staff, as well as agency staff counsel involved in the same CERCLA
litigation.
A staff-level firewall of this type would prohibit communication
and information exchange between enforcement and defense gov-
ernment counsel regarding the subject matter of a given suit, ex-
cept with respect to open settlement negotiations, court
conferences, court appearances or other communications and dis-
covery that are accessible to all private counsel. This would pro-
hibit opposing governmental staff attorneys from sharing attorney
work-product, protected attorney-client communications, confiden-
tial settlement negotiations and other information which would not
be available to a private party in litigation with the Government.
Under such a policy, in the event that disputes arise between
federal agencies represented by DOJ staff, which cannot be resolved
openly or which are not appropriate for public airing, such disputes
could be taken to the appropriate managerial level for resolution.
160. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of propo-
sal pertaining to staff-level firewalls and potential implementation of proposal);
supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (noting that establishing staff-level
firewalls is simpler solution).
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The same would be true for ultimate DOJ approval of initial plead-
ings, settlements in principle or final settlement documents, for
which the DOJ decision-maker would have access to all information
available to those at the staff level. Nevertheless, the DOJ decision-
maker would make every attempt not to reveal the confidential in-
formation obtained from one side at the staff level to the other side.
Other than with regard to matters appropriate for managerial
resolution, enforcement and defense government counsel would be
free to take independent positions in litigation and settlement ne-
gotiations without having to coordinate their strategies. Govern-
mental counsel representing either the defense or enforcement
side would also be able to enter into settlement confidentiality
agreements independently, provided such agreements did not pre-
vent the exchange of information otherwise discoverable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Enforcement of CERCLA by or on behalf of EPA is compli-
cated when federal agencies are PRPs at privately-owned Superfund
sites, owing to the Executive Branch's adherence to the Unitary Ex-
ecutive principle, which requires DOJ to represent both EPA and
federal PRP defendants in the same litigation. Yet, as I have at-
tempted to show, it is not clear that the Constitution prohibits adju-
dications between EPA and federal PRPs, nor requires the dual
representation of enforcing and defending agencies by DOJ before
the federal courts. In fact, under CERCLA, one may argue that
Congress has explicitly sanctioned such inter-agency litigation. 161
Rather, reliance on the Unitary Executive can be attributed to
policies of past administrations intended to strengthen the federal
Executive through centralized policy-making control. 162 In such a
scheme, all intra-executive disputes, extending to the enforcement
of environmental laws by one agency against another, are to be re-
solved within the Executive Branch and are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
Such a centralized management structure, however, may be ill-
suited to the modern executive, comprised as it is of multiple de-
partments and agencies commanding vast resources, performing va-
ried and disparate functions, each of which acts in its sphere as a
self-sufficient mini-government. It is not at all unrealistic to pre-
161. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 (21), 9620(a)(1) (authorizing inter-agency litiga-
tion).
162. See Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 628-30 (noting policies leading to reli-
ance on Unitary Executive principles).
32
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/1
MANACLED OCTOPUS
sume that such ponderous organizations, each independently
funded through Congressional appropriations, each with a distinct
mission, may sue and be sued as separate, independent legal enti-
ties. Indeed, some executive departments and other federal regula-
tory entities already have such authority.163 As I have attempted to
demonstrate, in CERCLA cases involving federal PRPs, indepen-
dent agency representation could result in greater and more timely
federal PRP compliance as well as a more cooperative private PRP
community.
Would this weaken the Executive? Quite the contrary. I have
proposed the paradigm of the octopus to describe the phenome-
non of the modem executive. It is not fragmentary: it has a head,
but apart from matters of national policy, its strength lies in the free
and muscular exercise of its independent limbs, not upon rigid cen-
tral control. In the CERCLA enforcement context, censorial con-
trol over inter-agency litigation cripples the modern executive: it
manacles the octopus. I would suggest that a truly strong executive,
in the absence of overriding national policy concerns, is one whose
agencies and departments are allowed to pursue their various mis-
sions with independence and vigor in the enforcement context.
Independent representation is unlikely to be accomplished by
act of Congress. However, there does exist a solution consistent
with the Unitary Executive principle which can be implemented
with a minimum of change to existing practices: staff-level
"firewalls" separating opposing government counsel in CERCLA
cases with federal PRPs. Such firewalls would allow DOJ manage-
ment to continue to function as policy-maker and executive media-
tor of inter-agency disputes, while freeing government staff or trial
counsel from the potential for conflict of interest when represent-
ing federal agency clients with adverse interests in the same litiga-
tion. This change would strengthen, not weaken, the Executive.
163. See supra note 155. Congress has granted independent litigation author-
ity to, e.g., the Consumer Products Safety Commission of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, 15 U.S.C. § 2061; the National Labor Relations Board, 29 U.S.C.
§ 154(a); the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
4(b) (2); the Securities and Exchange Commission, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(t) and 78(u);
the Department of Transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 1810(b); and the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 28 U.S.C. § 2323.
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